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ABSTRACT
Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin
secure vast amounts of money. Their operators, called miners, ex-
pend resources to generate blocks and receive monetary rewards
for their effort. Blockchains are, in principle, attractive targets for
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: There is fierce competition among
coins, as well as potential gains from short selling. Classical DoS
attacks, however, typically target a few servers and cannot scale
to systems with many nodes. There have been no successful DoS
attacks to date against prominent cryptocurrencies.
We present Blockchain DoS (BDoS), the first incentive-based DoS
attack that targets PoW cryptocurrencies. Unlike classical DoS,
BDoS targets the system’s mechanism design: It exploits the reward
mechanism to discourage miner participation. Previous DoS attacks
against PoW blockchains require an adversary’s mining power
to match that of all other miners. In contrast, BDoS can cause
a blockchain to grind to a halt with significantly less resources,
e.g., 17% as of Feb 2019 in Bitcoin according to our empirical study.
BDoS differs from known attacks like Selfish Mining in its aim
not to increase an adversary’s revenue, but to disrupt the system.
Although it bears some algorithmic similarity to those attacks, it
introduces a new adversarial model, goals, algorithm, and game-
theoretic analysis. Beyond its direct implications for operational
blockchains, BDoS introduces the novel idea that an adversary can
manipulate miners’ incentives by proving the existence of a secret
longest chain without actually publishing blocks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, implemented with blockchain
protocols based on Nakamoto [69], have a current market capital-
ization of about $180B [20]. Like classical state machine replication
protocols, blockchains allow participants to agree on a state, in
their case – the client balances of a cryptocurrency. Unlike those
classical protocols, however, public blockchains are decentralized
and allow anyone to join the system at will.
To deter Sybil attacks [28], where an attacker masquerades as
multiple entities, Nakamoto relies on incentives. Participants, called
miners, expend resources and generate Proofs of Work (PoW) [29,
45]. They are rewardedwith cryptocurrency for their efforts. Miners
aggregate cryptocurrency transactions into so-called blocks, each
containing PoW, and form a tree data structure. A path in the tree is
called a blockchain. The path representing the most work is called
the main chain; its contents define the system’s state.
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An extensive line of work (§2) explores revenue-driven attacks
against blockchains [32, 33, 53, 70, 78]. DoS attacks, where the at-
tacker is driven by exogenous incentives to stop a cryptocurrency
blockchain, have received less attention. This may be because classi-
cal, network-based DoS attacks [27] do not scale to large decentral-
ized systems and known mining-based DoS attacks [9, 10, 52] are
prohibitively costly, as they require the attacker’s mining resources
to be at least equal to those of all other miners combined.
In this work, we present a new type of sabotage attack called
Blockchain Denial of Service (BDoS). BDoS is incentive-based – the
attacker targets the system’s mechanism design and violates its
incentive compatibility. Specifically, the attacker invests resources
in order to incentivize rational miners to stop mining. A BDoS
adversary can cause a blockchain to cease functioning with only a
fraction of the resources of the other miners. It is the first formally
studied mechanism-based DoS attack of which we are aware.
The key element that enables BDoS is the consideration of miner
behavior §3 that is typically overlooked in previous work. First,
miners can stop mining intermittently if it benefits them, as demon-
strated in the wild [19, 30, 54]. The majority of previous work
assumes a constant number of miners, i.e., miners always mine.
Secondly, an attacker can signal the miners that the system is in
a state that reduces their revenue. Specifically, an attacker can
generate a block and publish only its header, proving that she has
spent the necessary resources, but without exposing the block’s
content. Although this option is technically practical, it was not
considered in prior work to the best of our knowledge. Finally, like
prior work [15, 30, 91], we consider miners that do not venture
with more elaborate strategic behavior [33, 70, 78], which indeed
has not been observed in the wild.
The crux of the attack (§4) is as follows. The attacker generates
a block 𝐵A and publishes only its header (fig. 1b); we then say the
attack is active. Aminer can ignore the existence of the header of𝐵A
and generate a block following its parent, resulting in a fork (fig. 1c).
In this case, the attacker publishes the contents of 𝐵A , resulting
in a race with two branches (fig. 1d). The miner’s block might or
might not end up in the main chain, depending on the parameters
of the system. The implication is that the expected profitability of
the rational miners decreases, and if it is low enough, then pausing
mining becomes a better option than mining. If the profitability
decrease is significant enough so that all miners stop mining, the
attacker can cease mining as well, while she has an advantage of
one block (𝐵A ). The blockchain thus grinds to a complete halt.
We formulate the behavior of the miners as a game and look
for a dominant strategy (§5). The attack is successful when not
mining is the best response of the miners, and it depends on several
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factors, mainly the sizes of the attacker and rational miners, and the
baseline profitability of mining. One might think that non-myopic
miners invested in the success of the system would be willing to
suffer a temporary profitability decline to overcome an attack and
keep the blockchain running. However, we find that their dilemma
is even more difficult if this is the case – if other miners behave
altruistically and ignore the attack, a rational miner has a stronger
incentive to stop mining until the attack becomes inactive.
We consider several extensions of the action space. First, in prac-
tice, miners can mine on block headers, performing so-called SPV
Mining. This action behavior is common, performed by otherwise
benign miners to slightly reduce latencies [75]. SPV mining leads
to an updated attack, as follows. If a rational miner successfully
mines a block that extends the attacker’s published header, the
attacker abandons this header and never publishes its content, ef-
fectively invalidating the rational miner’s block. We analyze the
new game (§6) using Iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies (IESDS) [34], and show that stop mining remains an
equilibrium under the same parameters.
Secondly, we observe that the situation becomes significantly
worse if miners have the option to use their resources in another
blockchain rather than stop (§7). If two cryptocurrencies have simi-
lar initial profitability, even a small BDoS attacker can tip the scale
and lead rational miners to defect from the attacked coin to the
now-more-profitable one.
Thirdly, we propose techniques for the attacker to prove she
has a hidden block without exposing its header, making mitigation
even harder (§8).
To empirically validate the practicality of BDoS, we calculate
profitability in the longest-running cryptocurrency, Bitcoin (§8). We
combine mining difficulty data with mining hardware consumption
and power, historical Bitcoin price fluctuation, and electricity costs.
For example, as of today, given that the miners in Bitcoin have
a $1.50 expected return on every $1 of electricity investment, an
attacker with 22% of the mining power can successfully induce a
complete shutdown. The instantaneous drop in block reward (and
thus profitability) that is expected to take place in 2020 will put
Bitcoin’s security at further risk. Moreover, since the profitability of
Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash are almost identical, the two-coin model
implies that BDoS poses an imminent threat for both coins.
Constructively, we propose some possible mitigations to
BDoS (§9). First, honest miners can prefer non-attacker blocks
on a fork with a heuristic time-based detector. Secondly, alterna-
tive reward mechanisms [14, 98] compensates miners on lost races,
making BDoS ineffective (though similar attacks might apply).
The discovery of BDoS adds another consideration for the evalu-
ation of blockchain systems and raises questions on the existence
of similar attacks against different blockchain designs (§10).
In summary:
• We introduce and explore new, practical actions in the action
space of adversaries and miners (§3).
• We initiate the first formal study of a mechanism-based
DoS attack on PoW blockchains called Blockchain Denial-of-
Service (§4).
• We formalize a game between rational miners and a BDoS adver-
sary and show when the dominant strategy is to stop mining (§5).
• We consider several extensions to the basic BDoS action / strategy
space, including SPV mining, mining on other blockchains, and
proofs of hidden blocks. We show that SPV mining doesn’t help,
and the other two hurt (§6,§7,§8).
• We empirically study BDoS attacks in Bitcoin, showing that
under reasonable assumptions a BDoS attacker can succeed with
roughly 17% mining power as of Feb 2019 (§8).
• We propose mitigations that can reduce the effectiveness of
BDoS (§9).
Responsible disclosure We have completed a disclosure process
with prominent blockchain development groups.
2 RELATEDWORK
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to study
incentive-based denial of service attacks against blockchains. We
present an overview here of previous work on denial-of-service
attacks in the context of blockchains, incentive-related behavior,
and other related work.
DoS Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [27] aim to prevent a system
from serving clients, and are often mounted from multiple ma-
chines as Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. In blockchain networks,
however, such techniques can only successfully target isolated sys-
tem elements [46, 68, 93] like cryptocurrency exchanges or mining
coordinators in pools. In eclipse attacks [16, 81, 82] an adversary
monopolizes all connections of a target node and isolates it from the
network. When applied to blockchain systems [40, 59], the victim’s
local view is no longer in sync with the network, disrupting the vic-
tim and amplifying other blockchain attacks [70]. Similar effects can
be achieved with routing attacks, chiefly BGP hijacking [2, 3, 89].
However, due to the decentralized structure of the system, nodes
outside the effect of the attack can continue to interact with the
blockchain as usual, apart from the possible reduction of attacked
mining power. In contrast, BDoS stops all blockchain progress.
Other attacks [56, 66, 67] saturate the blockchain to prevent
transactions from being placed. Such attacks, however, result in
graceful degradation, as the attacker simply raises the cost of trans-
action writes. Clients can still place transactions, albeit with a
higher fee, thus also increasing the attacker’s cost. Additionally,
unlike BDoS, such attacks require continuous resource expenditure
for the duration of the attack.
Majority (51%) attacks A 51% attack allows a miner that controls
the majority of the mining power in the system to fork any section
of the chain. She can mine on an old block and eventually build a
longer chain than anyminority competitors (even if the competitors
have a significant head start). An attacker controlling a majority of
the mining power violates the assumptions of PoW protocols and
can perform a full-fledged DoS attack by simply generating empty
blocks and ignoring other blocks. Since this is a majority attacker,
her chain will extend faster than any other chain, making it the
main chain, despite its empty content. An attacker with such power
can also perform other attacks violating the system’s safety prop-
erties. Goldfinger and bribery attacks [9, 10, 52, 57, 61, 90] utilize
miner bribery to achieve similar effects, only without requiring the
attacker to acquire mining power directly. Majority attacks have
2
been observed happening on smaller cryptocurrencies [11, 26, 41],
but not on major ones, possibly due to their high continuous cost. In
contrast to this family of attacks, BDoS requires significantly lower
than 50% mining-power budget, and no continuous expenditure.
Revenue-seeking deviations Nakamoto blockchains’ security
relies on incentive mechanisms that aim to reward miners that fol-
low the rules. One line of study [6, 50, 60, 70, 72, 76, 78] considers
the incentive compatibility of blockchain protocols. It analyzes min-
ing as a game, showing when the correct behavior is an equilibrium,
and when deviations allow the miners to increase their revenue, and
correct behavior is not an equilibrium. Such attacks may bias the
mining power structure, leading to centralization, or affect other
desired blockchain properties like censorship resistance. However,
their goal and analysis consider only the internal system revenue,
they do not consider exogenous malicious motivations, and they
cannot be directly applied to achieve complete denial of service.
Goren and Spiegelman [38] show that a miner can increase her
revenue by mining intermittently. Unlike BDoS, this is a revenue
seeking attack, only the attacker stops mining, and she is not ma-
nipulating the behavior of other miners.
Several incentive attacks can affect individual mining pools [32,
53, 55, 58, 77], but do not directly lead to macro effects on the
blockchain.
Incentive-based attacks Another line of work explores attacks
that use incentives to affect blockchain properties, using a form of
bribery. Judmayer et al. [48] categorize incentives attacks by their
goals into three groups: transaction revision, transaction ordering,
and transaction exclusion. These attacks may not violate protocol
safety directly, but can be used to force a particular order of trans-
actions [21, 31, 79], or transaction omission [47, 61, 63, 97]. They
do not affect the system liveness.
Non-Nakamoto blockchains The BDoS attack is explicitly de-
signed for a Nakamoto-like blockchain. Nakamoto-like protocols
with alternatives to PoW [17, 18, 95, 96, 99] are equally vulnerable.
On the other hand, it does not directly apply to the Ethereum
blockchain (that is more vulnerable to other attacks [72, 76],
though), where blocks receive partial reward even if they are off
the main chain, and so in case of a BDoS header publication, a
participant is indeed better off mining, getting at least a partial
reward. Blockchain operators should be aware of this new type of
attack and evaluate the resilience of their individual designs.
PoW alternatives such as Proof of Stake (PoS) [5, 22, 24, 37, 51]
typically do not require participants to waste significant resources
to approve transactions. Therefore, BDoS is not relevant to PoS in
general. However, Buterin [13] introduced the so-called Discourage-
ment Attack on PoS, where an attacker reduces the profit of other
participants by censoring victims’ messages, leading to a temporary
DoS.
3 MODEL
We describe the system model (§3.1), namely the participants,
their interaction, and network assumptions, and the resultant game
model (§3.2), namely the miners’ action space and utility function.
3.1 Mining Model
We model the system in a similar way to that of previous
works [35, 64, 73] using common network assumptions [33, 70, 78].
However, we define an additional capability of the attacker. Rather
than releasing a regular block, the attacker can release a partial
block data that serves as proof that the block was mined.
Blockchain data structures The system constructs a data struc-
ture called the blockchain, which is a collection of blocks. A block 𝐵
contains block data or payload, denoted by 𝐷 , and the metadata
called block header, denoted by𝐻 . Thus, a block is a pair 𝐵 = (𝐻,𝐷 ).
Each block contains a hash reference to another block, except the
so-called genesis block which we denote by 𝐵0.
The linked blocks form a tree. The longest chain of blocks
in the tree is called the blockchain. The blockchain is the main
data structure in the system, and it defines the state of the
cryptocurrency. Each block 𝐵 in the blockchain is either a full
block containing the entire block information (𝐻,𝐷 ), or a block
header without the block data (𝐻,⊥) where ⊥ denotes the lack
of data. The fact that the blockchain can consist of partial block
information is a refinement of our model compared to previous
work [6, 33, 35, 64, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78], where a blockchain consists
only of full blocks.
Participants We consider a system that comprises 𝑛 participants
called miners, we denote them by P1,P2, . . . ,P𝑛 , and an adver-
sary A. Each miner P𝑖 has an associated value 𝛼𝑖 called its mining
power, and the adversary A has mining power 𝛼A . The total min-
ing power is normalized to 1, 𝛼A +
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖 = 1. Each miner has
a public key known to all that allows her to prove her identity to
other miners using a secret called private key.
Each rational miner P𝑖 possesses a view of the blockchain 𝐿𝑖
locally. 𝐿Full𝑖 is the subset of 𝐿𝑖 that consists only of the full blocks
in 𝐿𝑖 – i.e. blocks of the form (𝐻,𝐷 ). As mentioned before, each
block 𝐵 in 𝐿𝑖 can either be a block header if P𝑖 does not receive the
block data or a full block otherwise.
P𝑖 also has a local order function 𝑂𝑖 : 𝐿Full𝑖 → {0, 1, . . . ,
𝐿Full𝑖 }.
This function indicates the order of full blocks in 𝐿𝑖 observed by
miner P𝑖 . Note that𝑂𝑖 is not defined for blocks that are not in 𝐿Full𝑖
– i.e. partial blocks of the form (𝐻,⊥). For all P𝑖 ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,P𝑛}
it holds that 𝑂𝑖 (0) = 0, that is all miners agree that the genesis
block is the first block. Different miners may have different order
functions on their full blocks depending on the order they receive
blocks locally.
We call path in the block tree consisting of full blocks a chain.
The longest chain of full blocks in 𝐿𝑖 represents the state of the
system for a miner P𝑖 and is called the main chain. When multiple
chains are the longest, P𝑖 prefers the chain she observes first to be
the main chain, i.e., the chain whose𝑂𝑖 (𝐵) value of the last block 𝐵
in the chain is the minimal among that of other chains.
Rushing We denote by 𝛾 the strength of A’s rushing ability [33,
70, 78]. Formally, 𝛾 is the expected ratio of rational miners that
adopt A’s block when A publishes it to compete with a newly
published block by some other miner P𝑖 at the same height, i.e.,
having the same sequential index in chains that contain them. The
remaining (1 − 𝛾) are the miners that adopt P𝑖 ’s new block.
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Scheduler The system progresses in rounds, orchestrated by so
called scheduler. During each round, the scheduler selects a miner
to generate a new block. Additionally, the scheduler acts as an inter-
mediate for the blocks propagation. All the messages are delivered
immediately, and the system is synchronous.
Each round has a duration. We denote with 𝜆 a system constant
called the round rate constant. It corresponds to the desired round
rate (average number of rounds per second) in the blockchain. For
instance, in Bitcoin 𝜆 = 110·60 s−1, thus a block is created on average
every 10 minutes.
At the beginning of each round 𝑟 , the scheduler asks each miner
whether she participates as a candidate to find a new block dur-
ing this round. We say that a participating miner is active in this
round. The scheduler also records the so-called block template of
each active miner, which is the scaffolding of the block consisting
of miner’s identity (using her private key) and the hash of the block
it extends. Then the scheduler chooses a miner to mine the next
block, from the set of active miners by a weighted random distribu-
tion. Each miner’s probability to be chosen is proportional to her
mining power. The selected miner can create a block in round 𝑟
and is called the winner of the round, we denote it by w𝑟 . We index
the blocks B = {𝐵0, 𝐵1, 𝐵2, . . . } by the order of their issuance, i.e.,
w𝑟 creates the block 𝐵𝑟 . We denote with 𝛼𝑟active the total mining
power of active miners in round 𝑟 . The scheduler then simulates the
duration of the round, which is determined using an exponential
distribution with the rate 𝜆 · 𝛼𝑟active. The only purpose of block gen-
eration time is to determine the cost of active miners (further details
are given in §3.2). If all the miners are mining during a round (i.e.,
𝛼𝑟active = 1) and 𝐿
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𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 , which we call the honest setting, it holds
that the exponential distribution of the duration of round 𝑟 has a
rate of 𝜆 · 𝛼𝑟active. In the general case, the exponential distribution
has a rate of 𝜆 Note that we do not consider difficulty adjustment
unless otherwise stated; thus, the expected block generation time
in a round is always 1𝜆 ·𝛼𝑟active .
Next, the scheduler is responsible for adding the partial or full
block to the private ledgers of all other miners. It treats the cases
of an adversarial winner and a rational winner separately. If the
adversaryA is chosen by the scheduler to mine a block, she decides
whether to publish the full block of 𝐵𝑟 or only the block header.
She then announces her decision to the scheduler. Receiving the
adversary’s decisions, the scheduler adds to the private ledgers of
the other miners either the full block or the block header of 𝐵𝑟
depending on A’s decision.
If a rational miner P𝑖 is chosen by the scheduler to mine a block,
the scheduler notifies the adversaryA of 𝐵𝑟 before sending it to any
rational miner. The adversary decides whether to race against 𝐵𝑟 .
In case she decides to race, she sends the full block that corresponds
to the previously withheld block. Otherwise, the adversary sends an
empty message. If the message is empty, the scheduler simply broad-
casts 𝐵𝑟 to all miners. Otherwise, the scheduler sends 𝐵𝑟 and A’s
competing blocks in different orders to different miners, to simulate
the connectivity factor 𝛾 : For each miner p ∈ {P1, ...,P𝑛} \ {w𝑟 },
with probability 𝛾 (1−𝛼A )1−𝛼A−𝛼w𝑟 the scheduler sends A’s competing
blocks first and then 𝐵𝑟 to p, and with probability 1 − 𝛾 (1−𝛼A )1−𝛼A−𝛼w𝑟
sends 𝐵𝑟 first and thenA’s blocks. Naturally,A sees her block first.
We assume that the scheduler can add blocks to the private
ledgers in an atomic way. This implies that the local blockchains 𝐿𝑖
are equal for all miners. The pseudo-code of the scheduler is in Ap-
pendix E.
3.2 Game-Theoretic Model
The systemmodel gives rise to a game played among the rational
miners given the adversary’s behavior.
Miners As before, a rational miner P𝑖 possess a mining power 𝛼𝑖 .
Each miner knows the adversary’s strategy and participates in
a game with a finite number of actions: {mine, stop}, which are
defined later. The sole purpose of the rational miners in this game
is to maximize their utility.
Utility For each rational miner P𝑖 we denote by Π𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑅𝑖 (𝑡),
and𝐶𝑖 (𝑡) her expected profit, revenue, and cost until time 𝑡 , respec-
tively. It holds that: Π𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖 (𝑡) −𝐶𝑖 (𝑡). We denote the average
revenue and cost per time unit, for P𝑖 by 𝑅𝑖 =Δ lim
𝑡→∞
𝑅𝑖 (𝑡 )
𝑡 and
𝐶𝑖 =
Δ lim
𝑡→∞
𝐶𝑖 (𝑡 )
𝑡 respectively. Consequently, the average profit per
time unit, for P𝑖 , is: Πˆ𝑖 =Δ 𝑅𝑖 −𝐶𝑖 . Notice that any constant cost is
neglected when we discuss about per second values of profit and
cost, therefore from now on we ignore the constant cost (or initial
cost) and assume there is only varying cost.
For simplicity, we assume that the coin price is constant during
the entire game, and thus we denote the block reward by 𝐾 . Dif-
ferent miners may mine at different costs per mining power. The
cost of miner P𝑖 per one second of mining is 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖 , where 𝑐𝑖 is the
normalized mining cost per second for P𝑖 . We assume that 𝑐𝑖 is con-
stant throughout the game. When there is no attack, the expected
profit per time unit is Πˆ𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 (𝜆𝐾 − 𝑐𝑖 ) .
In order to define the utility function, we normalize the expected
profit by the miner’s mining power. The utility function 𝑈 of P𝑖 is
thus:𝑈𝑖 =Δ Πˆ𝑖𝛼𝑖 . We conclude that the utility of the rational miner P𝑖
during an honest game (with no attack) is:
𝑈𝑏𝑖 =
Δ 𝜆𝐾 − 𝑐𝑖 . (1)
We also define the profitability factor 𝜔𝑏𝑖 for miner P𝑖 participating
in an honest game. Intuitively, the profitability factor is the return
per dollar investment for a miner in an honest game. Formally it is
defined as:
𝜔𝑏𝑖 =
Δ lim
𝑡→∞
𝑅𝑖 (𝑡)
𝐶𝑖 (𝑡) =
𝜆𝐾
𝑐𝑖
. (2)
We note that when 𝑈𝑏𝑖 > 0 it implies 𝜔
𝑏
𝑖 > 1 and 𝑈
𝑏
𝑖 < 0 im-
plies 𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 1.
Actions We consider miners that are rational, meaning that they
do not participate in the game when it is not profitable. The miners
are trying to maximize their profit within the protocol rules, with
the ability to exit the game – i.e. stop mining. Specifically, each
rational miner has two possible actions:
(1) mine - Mine on the main chain, or
(2) stop - Stop mining.
A miner chooses an action at the beginning of a round and commits
to it until the end of the round. Changing the action within the
4
𝐵∗
(a) State 0
𝐵∗ 𝐵A
(b) State 1
𝐵∗ 𝐵A
𝐵P
(c) State 2
𝐵∗ 𝐵A
𝐵P
(d) Race
Figure 1: States
round does not increase P𝑖 ’s utility since no new information is
available to P𝑖 during a round. The elapsed time does not provide
any new information due to the memorylessness property [78, 91].
This is formally justified in Appendix A.
Notice that if 𝜔𝑏𝑖 > 1, the rational miner always chooses mine if
there is no attack and if 𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 1 she chooses stop.
In case the adversary releases a block header, a rational miner
has to choose one of the two actions. The pseudocode that describes
the rational miner’s possible actions is in Appendix E.
4 THE BDOS ATTACK
The BDoS attack aims to incentivize rational miners to stop min-
ing. The crux is that an attacker (A) can bring the system to a state
where if a rational miner P𝑖 chooses mine and finds a block 𝐵P ,A
can invalidate 𝐵P—with some probability. Thus, while P𝑖 incurs
the same cost for performing mining (e.g., the cost of electricity)
as in the honest game, there is significantly larger profitability it
would be in vain.
We now describe the strategy, which is illustrated in fig. 1. Let 𝐵∗
denote the latest block on the main chain.A’s attack algorithm is to
mine on 𝐵∗ (fig. 1a). If she successfully appends a new block 𝐵A =
(𝐻A , 𝐷A ) to 𝐵∗ rather than publishing 𝐵A in full, she publishes
only its header (𝐻A ,⊥). She withholds the rest of the block, namely
its associated transactions. At this point, we refer to the state of the
attack as active. We refer to𝐵A as the leading block in the attack.𝐵A
is not part of the main chain, as it has not been published in full
(fig. 1b).
The header of 𝐵A serves as a proof that A has successfully
mined 𝐵A and is currently withholding the full block. Until a ratio-
nal miner produces a new block, A stops mining completely. Next,
two things can happen:
Block generated via mine: If at lease one miner performs mine
and successfully generates a block 𝐵P appended to 𝐵∗ (fig. 1c), A
immediately publishes 𝐵A in full, i.e., attempts to add it to the main
chain. A race ensues as describe in §3: Mining power is now divided
between 𝐵P and 𝐵A (fig. 1d). The first block to be extended “wins”
the race in the sense of becoming part of the main chain.
Rational miners stop mining: A stops mining as longs as
there no new block generated by rational miners.
The effect of the attack on P𝑖 ’s actions depends on the values of
the system parameters 𝜔𝑏𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼A . The pseudocode for BDoS is
in Appendix E.
5 ANALYSIS
If stop is the best response for all miners, we say the attack
is successful as it achieves a complete shutdown of the system. If
0 1 2
𝜆 · 𝛼𝑖
𝜆 · (1 − 𝛼A − 𝛼𝑖 )
𝜆 · 𝛼A 𝜆 · 𝛼𝐵∗
𝜆 · 𝛼𝑖
𝜆 · (𝛼A + 𝛾 (1 − 𝛼A ))
𝜆 · (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A )
(a) 𝑆mine: P𝑖 mines on 𝐵∗ in state 1
0 1 2
𝜆 · 𝛼𝑖
𝜆 · (1 − 𝛼A − 𝛼𝑖 )
𝜆 · 𝛼A 𝜆 · 𝛼𝐵∗
𝜆 · (𝛼A + 𝛾 (1 − 𝛼A ))
𝜆 · (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A )
(b) 𝑆stop: P𝑖 stops mining in state 1
Figure 2: Markov chain.
stop is the best response for some miners, there is only a partial
shutdown and we say BDoS is partially successful.
5.1 Game-Theoretic Analysis
We now derive the possible strategy space for a rational miner.
We analyze the game as an infinite-horizon game where the miners
play indefinitely [33, 85]. This applies although the cryptography
in the Nakamoto consensus breaks in an infinite game – as we
analyze an ergodic process, the average utility over infinite time
is similar to the average utility of finite games. Therefore, we are
interested in the expected profit per second of theminers that would
allow us to compare different strategies. In order to calculate it,
we construct a Continuous-Time Markov Chain for every strategy.
Unlike previous analysis of similar games [33], the block creation
rate varies when the attack is active/inactive, and therefore our
system cannot be described with a discrete-time Markov chain. The
Markov chains allow us to compute the utility function for each
strategy as a function of other players’ strategies. We analyze the
conditions for a specific strategy (that corresponds to stop mining)
to be a dominant strategy by comparison of the utility functions
given the same choice of the other players.
Strategies We evaluate the strategies from the perspective of a
rational minerP𝑖 . We definewithΛ𝐵∗ the set of miners activelymin-
ing on 𝐵∗ while the attack is active. Next, we define: 𝛼𝐵∗ =Δ
∑
𝑗 ∈Λ𝐵∗
𝛼 𝑗 .
Given the attack algorithm BDoS and honest game profitability 𝜔𝑏𝑖 ,
our goal is to find an optimal strategy for P𝑖 which she chooses at
the beginning of the game, i.e., a map from the private ledger 𝐿𝑖 and
the order function 𝑂𝑖 to an optimal action. We say that strategy 𝑆1
is more beneficial than strategy 𝑆2, for a rational P𝑖 , if the utility
by playing 𝑆1 is larger than the utility by playing 𝑆2. Consequently,
we consider only two strategies: 𝑆mine and 𝑆stop that differ only
by the actions of P𝑖 during the attack: mine and stop respectively.
We describe the game for each strategy with three-state Markov
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chains. Strategy 𝑆mine appears in fig. 2a and 𝑆stop in fig. 2b. In both
chains, state 0 represents the initial state where everyone mines on
𝐵∗ fig. 1a. State 1 represents the state where the adversary managed
to find a block fig. 1b. State 2 represents the race condition, where
the miners are divided between A’s block and the block generated
by a rational miner fig. 1c. In both strategies, P𝑖 chooses the action
mine when not in state 1 (when the attack is not active). We prove
this intuitive assumption in Appendix B. Therefore, each Markov
chain matches a strategy that differs only by the actions of the
miner in state 1.
State Probabilities We denote P𝑖 ’s strategy by 𝑆 and with 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
the total mining power of miners that mine on 𝐵∗ in state 1, i.e.,
the portion of miners who keep mining on 𝐵∗ during the attack:
𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) =Δ
{
𝛼𝐵∗ + 𝛼𝑖 , if 𝑆 = 𝑆mine
𝛼𝐵∗ , otherwise.
(3)
We proceed to calculating the state probabilities of the two Markov
chains in fig. 2:
𝑝𝑆0 =
𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) ,
𝑝𝑆1 =
𝛼A
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) ,
𝑝𝑆2 =
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) .
(4)
Notice that miner P𝑖 changes the state probabilities depending on
which strategy she chooses, as 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) depends on P𝑖 ’s strategy.
Utility For Each Strategy As the first step in calculating the
utility, we calculate the cost and the revenue of P𝑖 . While a rational
miner is mining, her cost per second is constant. However, when
she stops mining, her cost per second is zero. Therefore for 𝑆stop it
holds that the average cost per time unit 𝐶𝑆stop𝑖 for P𝑖 is:
𝐶
𝑆stop
𝑖 = lim𝑡→∞
𝐶
𝑆stop
𝑖 (𝑡)
𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 (1 − 𝑝𝑆stop1 ) · 𝑐𝑖 .
On the other hand when P𝑖 chooses strategy 𝑆mine and therefore
keeps mining all the time, her cost 𝐶𝑆mine𝑖 is constant:
𝐶𝑆mine𝑖 = lim𝑡→∞
𝐶𝑆mine𝑖 (𝑡)
𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖 · 𝑐𝑖 .
Therefore, it is left find the average revenues 𝑅𝑆stop𝑖 and 𝑅
𝑆mine
𝑖 for
𝑆stop and 𝑆mine respectively, in order to find the more beneficial
strategy.
We now analyze the Markov chain: For both strategies the ratio-
nal miner P𝑖 receives profit 𝐾 every time she passes from state 0
back to state 0 with the rate 𝛼𝑖𝜆 and from state 2 to 0 with rate 𝛼𝑖𝜆.
For strategy 𝑆mine, P𝑖 receives profit (1 −𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) ·𝐾 when she
passes from state 1 to state 2 with rate 𝛼𝑖𝜆. Therefore the expected
utility for strategy 𝑆stop is:
𝑈
𝑆stop
𝑖 =
1
𝛼𝑖
(𝑅𝑆stop𝑖 −𝐶
𝑆stop
𝑖 ) (5)
=
1
𝛼𝑖
· ((𝑝𝑆stop0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 ) · 𝛼𝑖𝜆𝐾 − (1 − 𝑝
𝑆stop
1 ) · 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖 )
= (𝑝𝑆stop0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 ) · 𝜆𝐾 − (1 − 𝑝
𝑆stop
1 ) · 𝑐𝑖 .
Similarly the expected utility for strategy 𝑆mine is:
𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖 =
1
𝛼𝑖
(𝑅𝑆mine𝑖 −𝐶𝑆mine𝑖 )
= (𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 )𝜆𝐾 − 𝑐𝑖 .
(6)
Conditions for Successful Attack We intend to calculate for
what values of 𝜔𝑏𝑖 (defined in eq. (2)) the attack would be successful
given 𝛼A and 𝛼𝑖 , i.e., the mining power of the attacker and a certain
rational miner P𝑖 . Note that in order for this attack to enforce
complete shutdown, we have to examine the miner with the largest
mining power. Using eq. (5) and eq. (6) we define 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) to be the
normalized difference between𝑈 𝑆stop𝑖 and𝑈
𝑆mine
𝑖 :
𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) =Δ
𝑈
𝑆stop
𝑖 −𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖
𝑐𝑖
= (𝑝𝑆stop0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 − 𝑝𝑆mine0 − 𝑝𝑆mine2
− (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 ) · 𝜔𝑏𝑖 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
1 .
(7)
Our goal is to find when the attack is successful and all miners stop,
that is, what are the 𝜔𝑏𝑖 values for which for all possible 𝛼𝐵∗ values
it holds that 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) < 0. We therefore calculate the condition
on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 so that 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) < 0 using eq. (7):
𝜔𝑏𝑖 <
𝑝
𝑆stop
1
𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 − (𝑝
𝑆stop
0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 )︸                                                                          ︷︷                                                                          ︸
𝑄 (𝛼𝐵∗ )
.
(8)
We use calculus to find the tight condition, and we get
that 𝑄 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) receives minimal value when 𝛼𝐵∗ = 0, regardless of
the parameters’ values.
This result implies that themotivation for a miner to keepmining
during the attack decreases when other miners keep mining, as the
minimum is achieved when all other miners are following 𝑆stop. By
assigning 𝛼𝐵∗ = 0 to eq. (8) and using the probabilities calculated
in eq. (4), the tight condition on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 is:
𝜔𝑏𝑖 <
𝛼A + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼A𝛼𝑖
𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼A𝛼𝑖 + (1 − 𝛾)𝛼A (1 − 𝛼A ) . (9)
This is the condition that ensures that 𝑆stop is dominant strategy
for P𝑖 . In other words, 𝑆stop is always the best strategy for P𝑖
regardless of other payers’ actions. Notice that the dominant strategy
is 𝑆stop for all miners if the condition in eq. (9) holds for all miners
in the system.
5.2 Threshold Values
We consider specific system parameter values and the resulting
threshold on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 for a successful attack.
First we use the condition on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 that was obtained in eq. (9).
Figure 3 shows the highest 𝜔𝑏𝑖 that allows the attack for different
values of 𝛼A , 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾 . Unlike previous attacks, even an attacker
with a relatively small computational power (e.g., 𝛼A < 0.1) can
successfully mount an attack to stop all other miners from mining.
The mining power of the rational miner 𝛼𝑖 is also important to the
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Figure 3: 𝜔𝑏𝑖 that will allow an attack for different 𝛼𝐴 , 𝛾
and 𝛼𝑖 (Notice that 𝛾 can’t reach 1 in real setting).
success of the attack. For example, with 𝛼A = 0.2 and 𝛼𝑖 = 0.05,
the threshold 𝜔𝑏𝑖 is almost 1.9. Note that even if all the rational
miners have similar profitability, a small attacker would be able to
stop only smaller miners. This shows that large mining pools have
stronger protection against BDoS.
Moreover, fig. 3 shows that when 𝛾 = 0 and 𝛼A = 0.2, the
attacker needs 𝜔𝑏𝑖 to be smaller than 1.15 in order to attack a ra-
tional miner with 𝛼𝑖 = 0.1, compared to 𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 1.6 when 𝛾 =
1
2 and
𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 2.7when 𝛾 = 1. This highlights the importance of the rushing
ability for the attacker. Note that𝛾 = 12 is a conservative assumption
primarily since an adversary can control a relay network [36] and
therefore potentially achieve 𝛾 even closer to 1. In §8, we further
show that even if the rational miners are deviating fromNakamoto’s
protocol by boycottingA’s blocks (and therefore decreasing 𝛾 ), she
can use smart contracts (on external cryptocurrency) to make her
blocks indistinguishable from rational miners’ blocks.
Fixing 𝛼𝐵∗ We found the borderline 𝜔𝑏𝑖 for the worst case, i.e., for
all possible chosen strategies of other miners. But we saw that if
the portion of rational miners that keep mining 𝛼𝐵∗ increases, the
motivation for P𝑖 to stop mining also increases. We now consider
a scenario where P𝑖 can accurately estimate 𝛼𝐵∗ . In practice, this
can be done by spying on other pools [32, 87] or by monitoring
the recent inter-block time. As before, we assume that 𝛼A = 0.
Using eq. (8), we conclude that the bound on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 is 𝑄 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) (eq. (8)).
We define: 𝛼r =
𝛼𝐵∗
1−𝛼A−𝛼𝑖 , which is the absolute portion of rational
miners other than P𝑖 that continue mining. We plot the borderline
𝜔𝑏𝑖 , 𝛼A and 𝛼𝑖 for different 𝛼r values in fig. 4.
We can see that if all other rational miners chose 𝑆mine (𝛼r = 1),
then for 𝛼A = 0.2 and 𝛼𝑖 = 0.16, P𝑖 stops mining for 𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 2 which
is significantly higher than 𝜔𝑏𝑖 < 1.45 for the case with 𝛼r = 0.
As expected, the threshold for a partial shutdown is significantly
higher than the threshold for a complete shutdown.
6 BDOS ATTACKWITH SPV MINING
So far, we assumed that no rational miner would mine on the
block header. We note that publishing the header allows miners to
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Figure 4: 𝜔𝑏1 that will allow an attack for different 𝛼r, 𝛼A
and 𝛼𝑖 while 𝛾 = 12 .
try to extend it in an optimistic manner, as a block can be extended
using only its hash. In practice, this type of mining is common
and called SPV mining [75]. According to Nakamoto consensus, no
miner considers a block that references a header as part of her main
chain, as the state is undefined without the content of the block.
It is also impossible to validate the transactions of the next block
(even if it is a full block). Therefore, when engaging in SPV mining,
a miner assumes that the full block corresponding to the header
would be published in the future.
6.1 Model Updates
To assume miners can SPV mine, we have to extend our defini-
tion for miners’ behavior and assume that they can digress from
the protocol with small deviations. Like Carlseten et al. [15] we say
that the miners are petty-compliant, that is, they only take steps that
almost follow the protocol, namely extending the longest chain,
leave the protocol or engage in SPV mining. As SPV mining is a
common behavior in practice, we are still considering benign min-
ers, but expand the model to include a third action mineSPV where
the miner tries to extend the attacker’s block 𝐵A . Consequently,
we add a third strategy to the rational miners’ strategy space, min-
ing on the attacker’s header during the attack. We denote it with
𝑆SPV.
In addition, we assume that the A is aware of when a rational
miner P𝑖 finds a block that extends A’s header. More formally, if
P𝑖 won the round, the scheduler adds her block to all other miners’
ledgers, including A’s. On a practical note, this can be done by
spying on other mining pools. Thus, A can join all major mining
pools as a miner and be warned when the mining pool manages to
find a block that extends her block header.
Therefore we change A’s strategy slightly so that when a ratio-
nal miner successfully finds block𝐵P that extends𝐵A ,A abandons
𝐵A and return mining on 𝐵∗.A commits never to publish the data
that corresponds to 𝐵A , practically invalidating 𝐵P .
Note If we consider a setting where A can ignore or be unaware
of a new block mined by P𝑖 that extends her header, the attack,
in fact, becomes stronger. This is because the new block would
be withheld until A publishes the content of the header. But A
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would only publish it in case of a race condition. By releasing the
header, P𝑖 immediately causes A to win in the race. So if miners
chose 𝑆SPV in such a setting, they only decrease the motivation
for other miners to choose 𝑆mine. Moreover, the blocks mined with
SPV are likely to be empty, as a miner who does not possess all the
transactions in the current state would not risk invalidating her
block by causing conflicts. We, therefore, leave the analysis of this
case outside the scope of this paper.
6.2 Analysis Changes
As before we denote with Λ𝐵A the set of miners actively mining
on 𝐵A while the attack is active. We define: 𝛼𝐵A =
Δ ∑
𝑗 ∈Λ𝐵A
𝛼 𝑗 . Next,
in the same way as in eq. (3) we denote with 𝛼𝐵A (𝑆) the mining
power of miners that mine on 𝐵A in state 1:
𝛼𝐵A (𝑆) =Δ
{
𝛼𝐵A + 𝛼𝑖 , if 𝑆 = 𝑆SPV
𝛼𝐵A , otherwise.
To analyze the dominant strategy, we construct Markov chains
for each strategy in the new strategy space {𝑆stop, 𝑆mine, 𝑆SPV},
similarly to what was done in §5. First, we calculate the state prob-
abilities for each strategy. We denote the states probabilities with
𝑝𝑆0 , 𝑝
𝑆
1 and 𝑝
𝑆
2 for states 0, 1 and 2 respectively (as in §5). Recall that
states 0, 1 and 2 correspond to the initial, attack is progress and
race states respectively. We denote the utility functions by 𝑈 𝑆stop𝑖 ,
𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖 and𝑈
𝑆SPV
𝑖 for 𝑆stop, 𝑆mine and 𝑆SPV respectively. The Markov
chains for 𝑆mine and 𝑆stop are almost identical to the ones described
in fig. 2, with a new edge from state 1 to state 0 that corresponds to
a portion 𝛼𝐵A of other miners that mine onA’s block. The Markov
chain for 𝑆SPV is similar to the new Markov chain for 𝑆stop but with
an edge from state 1 to state 0 that corresponds to P𝑖 ’s efforts to
extend 𝐵A . The full Markov chains are described in Appendix D.
Next we calculate the state probabilities for each state depending
on the strategy using basic Markov chains analytical analysis:
𝑝𝑆0 =
𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼𝐵A (𝑆)
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵A (𝑆) + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
,
𝑝𝑆1 =
𝛼A
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵A (𝑆) + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
,
𝑝𝑆2 =
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
𝛼A · 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆) + 𝛼A + 𝛼𝐵A (𝑆) + 𝛼𝐵∗ (𝑆)
.
(10)
The utilities for 𝑆stop and 𝑆mine are identical to the ones in 5
and 6 in respect to state probabilities, as non of the original edges
where P𝑖 gets a reward have changed. Finally, we calculate the
utility for playing 𝑆SPV:
𝑈 𝑆SPV𝑖 =
1
𝛼𝑖
(𝑅𝑆SPV𝑖 −𝐶𝑆SPV𝑖 )
= (𝑝𝑆SPV0 + 𝑝𝑆SPV2 ) · 𝜆𝐾 − 𝑐𝑖 .
(11)
6.3 Narrowing down the possible number of
strategies
In order to simplify the analysis, we spot a dominated strategy,
i.e., a strategy that is always less beneficial compared to another
strategy.
Claim 6.1. 𝑆SPV is strictly dominated by 𝑆mine.
Proof. We calculate the difference Δ between the utility of
playing 𝑆mine (defined in eq. (6)) and the utility of playing 𝑆SPV
(defined in eq. (11)):
Δ =Δ 𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖 −𝑈 𝑆SPV𝑖
= 𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1
− (𝑝𝑆SPV0 + 𝑝𝑆SPV2 )) · 𝜆𝐾.
(12)
We notice that the probability 𝑝𝑆1 (eq. (10)) decreases when P𝑖
chooses 𝑆mine instead of 𝑆SPV, the numerator stays the same while
the denominator increases. We conclude that 𝑝𝑆mine1 < 𝑝
𝑆SPV
1 and
therefore:
(𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 ) − (𝑝𝑆SPV0 + 𝑝𝑆SPV2 ) (13)
=(1 − 𝑝𝑆mine1 ) − (1 − 𝑝𝑆SPV1 ) = 𝑝𝑆SPV1 − 𝑝𝑆mine1 > 0.
From eq. (12) and eq. (13) we conclude that Δ > 0. Therefore by
playing 𝑆mine, P𝑖 always has a strictly larger profit than she would
have if she would play 𝑆SPV. □
From now on we consider only two strategies for P𝑖 in our
analysis: 𝑆mine and 𝑆stop, as we proved that P𝑖 never chooses strat-
egy 𝑆SPV. Notice that we still have to consider 𝑆SPV for other miners
in order to find conditions for 𝑆stop to be dominant strategy (§6.4).
In §6.5 we relax this in order to argue about the more practical
setting where no rational miner chooses a dominated strategy.
6.4 Conditions for Successful Attack
As in §5.1 we calculate for what values of 𝜔𝑏𝑖 the attack would
be successful given 𝛼A and 𝛼𝑖 . We define 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ , 𝛼𝐵A ) to be the
normalized difference between𝑈 𝑆stop𝑖 and𝑈
𝑆mine
𝑖 :
𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ , 𝛼𝐵A ) =Δ
𝑈
𝑆stop
𝑖 −𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖
𝑐𝑖
= (𝑝𝑆stop0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 − 𝑝𝑆mine0 − 𝑝𝑆mine2
− (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 ) · 𝜔𝑏𝑖 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
1 .
(14)
As before we find for values of 𝜔𝑏𝑖 for all possible 𝛼𝐵∗ and 𝛼𝐵A it
holds that 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ , 𝛼𝐵A ) < 0. We therefore calculate the condition
on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 so that 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ , 𝛼𝐵A ) < 0 using eq. (14):
𝜔𝑏𝑖 <
𝑝
𝑆stop
1
𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 − (𝑝
𝑆stop
0 + 𝑝
𝑆stop
2 )︸                                                                          ︷︷                                                                          ︸
𝑄 (𝛼𝐵∗ ,𝛼𝐵A )
.
(15)
This is the general bound on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 that makes 𝑆stop the dominant
strategy forP𝑖 . This can be solved for specific values of𝛾 ,𝛼A and𝛼𝑖
and otherwise it’s not analytically solvable for the parametric case.
6.5 Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated
Strategies
The result in eq. (15) is the condition for 𝑆stop to be strictly dom-
inating strategy among the three strategies: {𝑆stop, 𝑆mine, 𝑆SPV}.
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We use a technique called iterated elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies (IESDS) [34] and show that our game is dominance-
solvable game. We assume that no rational miner chooses to mine on
𝐵A and that this is a common knowledge that no other miner would
mine on it [4], as this is a strictly dominated strategy as we showed
in §6.3. This elimination would leave us with the only Nash equilib-
rium in the game. Therefore, we analyze the case where 𝛼𝐵A = 0.
This implies that if the result in eq. (9) holds for all rational miners,
𝑆stop is the only Nash equilibrium in the game [52]. This equilib-
rium is conceptually stronger than general equilibrium, as it implies
that 𝑆stop is the best strategy regardless of other miners’ rational
strategies.
7 TWO-COIN MODEL
So far, we used a model where the attacker initiates an attack on
coin 𝐶 , and the rational miners can either mine on this coin or not
mine at all.
We now consider a two-coin model where miners can choose to
mine between two coins alternately. This requires the two coins
to share similar mining algorithm so that miners could mine on
both coins with similar efficiency. The main conceptual difference
from the previous model is that miners have less to lose by ceasing
mining activity on one coin. If the profitability of the coins is similar,
even if the attacker lowers the expected profit even slightly, the
miners would still be motivated to quit mining and switch to the
other coin.
Due to the large number of coins in the blockchain world and
the fact that some of them use the same or similar mining schemes,
the mentioned above alternative model is more realistic [39, 42, 54,
62, 74, 80, 84, 88].
When there is a profitability difference, miners are expected
to switch coins to the more profitable coin. By doing that, they
cause the profitability to decrease in the long term (due to difficulty
adjustment) and bring the coins’ profitability to equilibrium. We
describe a way to create artificial profitability differences between
the coins, consequently causing all rational miners to abandon one
of the coins for the other(s).
7.1 Model Changes
In our two-coin model, we assume a rational miner can choose
between mining on𝐶 or a competing coin𝐶 ′ with the same mining
mechanism. We denote the profitability and utility of P𝑖 for coin 𝐶
with 𝜔𝑏𝑖 and𝑈𝑖 respectively, and the profitability and utility of P𝑖
for coin 𝐶 ′ with 𝜔𝑏′𝑖 and𝑈
′
𝑖 respectively. In case the initial mining
profitability for the miner with the largest mining power P𝑖 , on
both coins, is equal, thus 𝜔𝑏𝑖 = 𝜔
𝑏′
𝑖 , the attacker has no longer an
upper bound on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 , that would be a threshold for an attack on coin
𝐶 . This is because any attack always decreases the mining utility𝑈𝑖
for P𝑖 (mining on coin 𝐶) and therefore every miner would choose
to mine on 𝐶 ′ instead (as𝑈𝑏′𝑖 > 𝑈𝑖 ).
7.2 Analysis
Themodel is almost the same as the one described in §3.2, and the
analysis would be similar to the analysis in §5. The main difference
is that we no longer consider a choice between mine on 𝐵∗ and stop
but between mining on 𝐵∗ in the attacked coin 𝐶 and mining on
another coin𝐶 ′. The utility𝑈 𝑆
1
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 forP𝑖 for the first strategy 𝑆1𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
(mining on 𝐵∗ in coin 𝐶) is the same as 𝑈 𝑆mine𝑖 in eq. (6), thus
𝑈
𝑆1𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 = 𝑈
𝑆mine
𝑖 .
While the utility𝑈 𝑆2𝑖 for P𝑖 for the second strategy 𝑆2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒 (min-
ing in the honest setting in coin 𝐶 ′) is similar to 𝑈𝑏𝑖 in eq. (1). We
use different 𝜆, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝐾 parameters for the second coin (𝜆′, 𝑐 ′𝑖 and
𝐾 ′ respectively), as they are not necessary the same for both coins.
Thus:𝑈 𝑆
2
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 = 𝑈
𝑏′
𝑖 = 𝜆
′𝐾 ′−𝑐 ′𝑖 . To compare the two utilities in two
different coins, we can no longer use the normalized utility, as the
mining power constants 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛼 ′𝑖 of coin𝐶 and𝐶 ′ respectively, are
not necessarily the same. Notice that the mining cost per second of
P𝑖 is equal for both coins, so that 𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼 ′𝑖 𝑐 ′𝑖 . We define 𝐷 as the
difference between the two utilities𝑈 𝑆
1
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 and𝑈
𝑆2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 , when each
utility is multiplied by the respective hashrate:
𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) =Δ
𝛼𝑖𝑈
𝑆1𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖 − 𝛼 ′𝑖𝑈
𝑆2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖
𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖
=
𝛼𝑖𝑈
𝑆1𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖
𝛼𝑖𝑐𝑖
− 𝛼
′
𝑖𝑈
𝑆2𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒
𝑖
𝛼 ′𝑖 𝑐 ′𝑖
= (𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 ) · 𝜔𝑏𝑖 − 𝜔𝑏
′
𝑖 .
As before we ask when it holds that 𝐷 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) < 0. Therefore we are
looking for the ratio 𝑟 s.t:
𝑟 =Δ
𝜔𝑏
′
𝑖
𝜔𝑏𝑖
> (𝑝𝑆mine0 + 𝑝𝑆mine2 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛼A ) · 𝑝𝑆mine1 )︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸
𝑊 (𝛼𝐵∗ )
.
We now need to calculate the maximal value𝑊 (𝛼𝐵∗ ) can get. Using
calculus we derive that it attains maximum for 𝛼𝐵∗ = 1 − 𝛼A − 𝛼𝑖
which holds when all other miners do not switch coins (as this is
the maximum utility they can get):
𝑟 >𝑊 (𝛼𝐵∗ = 1 − 𝛼A − 𝛼𝑖 )
=
(1 − 𝛼A ) (𝛼A (𝛾 − 2) − 1)
𝛼2A − 𝛼A − 1
= 𝑟∗ .
An interesting fact is that the minimal 𝑟 that allows the attack,
which we denote with 𝑟∗, does not depend on the mining power
of P𝑖 .
We plot 𝑟∗ that allows the attack for different 𝛾 and 𝛼A in fig. 5.
When 𝛾 = 12 and 𝛼A = 0.2, it holds that 𝑟∗ = 0.9. This means such
an attacker can attack as long as 𝐶 profitability is less than 11%
more profitable than 𝐶 ′. Notice that the attack is always possible
when the profitability of 𝐶 ′ is equal to the one of 𝐶 , i.e. 𝑟 = 1. In §8
we show such conditions exist currently between Bitcoin ABC and
Bitcoin.
8 PRACTICAL CONCERNS
8.1 Attack Cost
We investigate the cost of attack for different attacker sizes. Note
that in the previous sections, we assumed that an existing miner
aims to disable the coin, ignoring the hardware cost. We first recall
that portion of time spent in state 1 of fig. 2 is 𝑝1. It immediately
follows that the attacker’s cost is: 𝛼A𝑐A (1 − 𝑝1) as the attacker
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(𝑝1) for varying 𝛼𝐴 , 𝛼′r. Here, 𝛼𝐵A = 0.
mines at a constant rate in all states but 1. In Appendix C we
calculate the cost per day of achieving hash power equivalent to
that of the entire Bitcoin network. This is $7,104,000 given the use
of Antminer S9 SE rigs and $3,508,438 for Antminer S17 Pro. For
majority hashpower, an attacker needs only 𝛼A (1 − 𝑝1) of these
costs.
We plot the graph of 𝑝1 vs.𝛼A in fig. 6.We denote by𝛼 ′r =
𝛼𝐵∗+𝛼𝑖
1−𝛼A
the total fraction of rational miners who keep mining. The results
of the graph are not surprising for 𝛼 ′r = 0, as in such case A takes
complete control of the system, and the Markov chain stays in
state 1 forever at cost 0. Notice that for a complete failed attack
(𝛼 ′r = 0), the system still spends 0.17 of the time in state 1 and pays
a total 0.165 of the mining cost ($580k a day for the Antminer S17
Pro).
For 𝛼A = 0.2 and given a small fraction of altruistic miners, for
example, 𝛼 ′r = 0.1, we will spend 6.5% of the entire mining cost
($65k a day for the Antminer S17 Pro). We showed that the attack
would be less costly than regular mining with 𝛼𝑖 , and significantly
cheaper if only a small portion of the miners are altruistic.
8.2 Publication Method
The BDoS attack requires the adversary to announce a block
header without revealing a full block. We first describe practical
methods for propagating a block header. In the rest of the subsection,
we describe few alternative methods for proving that the adversary
found a block, without revealing identifying details about the block.
In order to propagate the block header, the attacker can announce
that she is committing to an attack, and attach a web link to her
private web page. The webpage would be then used to publish her
block headers. Rational miners have the incentive to poll this exter-
nal website, as more information means larger long-term revenue.
It is important to stress that by ignoring the website and therefore,
the attack, miners are necessarily decreasing their profit.
Instead of sending a block header, the adversary can use a smart
contract (potentially on external coin) to demonstrate the discovery
of a block without revealing its header.
The idea is to use an economic mechanism to demonstrate knowl-
edge of a valid block header 𝐻 . Briefly, the attacker places large
collateral in the contract, along with a cryptographic commitment
Comm to 𝐻 , and with the previous block. If, at some predetermined
(distant) future time, she de-commits a valid 𝐻 for the contract, i.e.,
one that points to the previous block, she recovers the collateral.
Otherwise, she forfeits the collateral to miners. Thus, the attacker
is incentivized to claim and commit only to a valid header, but need
not reveal any information about 𝐻 (until 𝐻 is no longer useful to
miners).
To ensure that the attacker has the incentive to commit to a
valid 𝐻 , the collateral should be significantly larger than the cost
of mining blocks during the commitment period. The collateral,
if forfeited, can be split among a predefined list of mining pools
(weighted by their mining power). For example, this list might
include miners of the last, e.g., 1,000 blocks.
This approach has one key advantage over the block header ap-
proach: until𝐻 is de-committed (again, in the far future), no rational
miner can distinguish the attacker’s block from an honest block as,
during the race, the other miners only posses a commitment for the
block rather than a block header or hash. This approach prevents
rational miners from forming a coalition that would ignore the
attacker’s block. When the attacker reveals the block after a long
time, it would be impractical to ignore it as it would require to reorg
a block located deep in the main chain.
It is possible to build the smart contract in a way that when an
attacker finds a block, instead of sending the commitment to the
smart contract, an action that can delay the attack significantly, she
can publish an undeniable commitment to the network.
Another method that can achieve a similar effect is Zero-
Knowledge proof. An attacker can publish a non-interactive Zero-
Knowledge proof on her website and prove she found a block header
without exposing identifying information like the block hash. Like
in the case of smart contracts, rational miners would not be able to
distinguish the attacker’s block from an honest block in case of a
race.
Exact details for both methods are beyond the scope of this paper.
8.3 Practical 𝜔𝑏
The success of the attack relies critically on the baseline prof-
itability 𝜔𝑏 . To estimate realistic values for 𝜔𝑏 , we study the prop-
erties of Bitcoin, as the archetypal PoW cryptocurrency. We would
like to understand the costs that affect 𝜔𝑏 . Next, we would like to
find out, how and when 𝜔𝑏 changes, this is important due to the
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attacker’s liberty to choose the moment of the attack. Finally, we
are interested in estimating real values for 𝜔𝑏 , using both previous
work and our own estimation.
CAPEXandOPEX First, we can separate theminer’s cost into two
categories: Operating expense (OPEX or ongoing cost) and capital
expense (CAPEX or sunk cost). A similar separation of costs can
be found in [39, 49]. The OPEX would include costs like Electricity
cost of mining equipment, electricity cost of hardware cooling.
The CAPEX would include costs like buying/renting facilities and
buying mining. As we compare 𝑆stop to other strategies, we can
ignore the CAPEX cost because all strategies have an identical
initial cost. Moreover, in §5 we showed that the CAPEX is not
relevant in our infinite-horizon game, as it does not change the
profit per second.
Nevertheless, high CAPEX keeps 𝜔𝑏 high, as miners have to
return their initial investment. Lower CAPEX can cause 𝜔𝑏 to
decrease as more potential miners would join the game, bringing
the system closer to equilibrium [7, 38, 43, 92] – i.e. 𝜔𝑏 close to 1.
As we showed in §5 this would hurt the security of the system as
small attackers would be able to mount a successful BDoS attack.
𝜔𝑏 Fluctuations More than 50% of the hash power in Bitcoin is
originated from Sichuan, China [100]. The reason for that is that the
price of electricity in this region is extremely low during the wet
season (as low as $0.04 per kWh, which may vary by hydropower
plants). Moreover, at the end of the wet season or in unexpected
dry periods, the difficulty would remain high, but with the rise of
electricity prices, the profitability of most miners is expected to be
at its lowest point. This would be the ideal moment to attack.
Another essential factor that can make the system vulnerable
to the attack is the block reward adjustment that is estimated to
happen in the year 2020 [1]. The block reward will then drop
from 12.5BTC to 6.25BTC. The transition would be immediate;
therefore, this will cause a significant drop in 𝜔𝑏 . An attacker can
prepare for such an event and launch her attack at the exact moment
of the drop.
Estimating Upper Bound for 𝜔𝑏 Estimating 𝜔𝑏 is based on sev-
eral parameters. Mining hardware rates and electricity consumption
of different mining hardware are available in ASIC Miner Value [65].
We analyzed Bitcoin blocks 471744 to 602784 (June 17, 2017 –
Nov 7, 2019) using the Google BigQuery [25] Bitcoin dataset to
collect mining difficulty data and compute the expected number of
hashes needed to find a block [94]. We consider an electricity price
of $0.05 per kWh [7] and Bitcoin prices from [44]. fig. 7 shows the
profitability of mining Bitcoin with the best mining hardware at
each time, as well as with S9.
Eghbali and Wattenhofer [30] estimate that at the beginning of
2019 almost all miners used S9 machines (or similar). Based on this
data with conservative $0.04 [7] per kWh electricity price, assuming
largest rational miner is 16% and𝛾 = 12 , an attacker with 17%mining
power could have successfully launched a BDoS attack in Feb 2019.
According to the same assumptions, if the Bitcoin price would have
dropped extra 22% to $2950, even an adversary with 5% of the
mining power could have successfully launched the attack.
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8.4 Simulation of Realistic Mining Pools
Even if the mining profitability is not low enough for a complete
shutdown, a BDoS attacker can still discourage some small miners
from mining. This is because, the upper bound on 𝜔𝑏𝑖 that drives a
rational miner out of mining increases with the mining power of P𝑖 ,
as shown in fig. 3. Assuming all miners have the same profitability
factor 𝜔𝑏 , consider an adapting process in which rational miners
are always aware of the total mining power of active miners in the
network, and choose between 𝑆mine and 𝑆stop adaptively. A rational
miner P𝑖 chooses to mine if the real-world 𝜔𝑏 is higher than the
upper bound for P𝑖 , and stops mining otherwise. The process starts
with the state in which everyone mines and ends when no rational
miner changes her strategy anymore. Thus at the end of the process,
rational miners reach a Nash equilibrium. We simulate the process
to find an equilibrium where all rational miners may fall in. In the
simulation, we assume A’s rushing ability factor 𝛾 is 0.5. We use
the mining power of real pools collected from [12] on Oct 25, 2019,
which is estimated as the block generation rate of each mining pool
during the past week. We view each mining pool as an individual
miner. To be conservative, we assume all the hash power from
unknown sources form a single entity. Note that we introduce the
11
adversary as a new miner entering the game with existing mining
pools, so the actual mining power of each rational miners in the
simulation is scaled with a factor 1 − 𝛼A . We plot the proportion
of rational miners that stop mining in the Nash Equilibrium with
different mining profitability 𝜔𝑏 in separate curves in fig. 8. The
simulation indicates that for an adversary with only 20% of mining
power, she may stop more than half of rational miners even when
the real-life profitability is 2.
8.5 Estimating Practical 𝑟
To justify the analysis in §7, we are interested in finding whether
miners tend to switch between coins, with identical mining algo-
rithms, according to their profitability. Besides, we are interested to
see if this causes the profitability of coins to be close to each other
over time.
In [54], the authors collect data from inside mining pools and
show that suchmigrations between coins happen frequently. In [88],
the authors found a correlation between profitability changes of
Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash with the changes in the hash rate of the
two coins, concluding that miners migrate between coins according
to profitability.
The ratio between profitabilities of Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash,
presented in [23], is equivalent to 𝑟 that was defined in §7. We can
see that 𝑟 is close to 1 and often is within 5% error range. Such
realistic values for 𝑟 would allow an attacker with 10% (and even
less) of the mining power to mount a successful attack.
9 MITIGATION
We now describe possible mitigations for BDoS attacks.
Uncle blocks The attack described in this work designed to
attack Bitcoin and similar coins. However, it is not practical in
Ethereum [14, 98]. The main property of Ethereum that might pre-
vent the BDoS attacks is the uncle block mechanism [98]. This
mechanism rewards miners who mined blocks that are directly con-
nected to the main chain, but their block was excluded as a result
of a longer sequence of blocks. This imposes a significant challenge
on our attack, as now, in case a rational miner loses the “race”, her
reward is almost as the original block reward. Therefore, by pub-
lishing a block header, the attacker no longer reduces the expected
profit of rational miners significantly. Notice that the mechanism
does not grant a reward for blocks that are not directly connected
to the main chain. Consequently, there are likely similar attacks
to the one described in this paper that still allow the attacker to
decrease the expected reward, e.g., by publishing two-block headers
that fork the most recent block in the chain. However, the design
for such an attack is beyond the scope of this work.
Another work suggests an alternative to Nakamoto blockchain,
where blocks always included in the data structure [83]. This elimi-
nates the risk for a miner to lose her block and therefore turns BDoS
to ineffective.
Ignoring attacker’s block during race Another possible way to
weaken the attack is to change miner behavior so that if there is a
fork, a miner should prefer blocks not generated by an attacker. The
challenge is to identify attack blocks. A third party service for this
goal is out of the question as it violates the decentralized nature of
the system and allows false incrimination. Instead, we propose to
classify according to the time interval between the reception of the
header and the reception of the block. We can safely assume that
for a non-attack block, this interval is bounded by, e.g., one minute,
and blocks with a longer interval are suspect.
Notice that this mitigation is possible only when the adversary
chooses to prove that she mined a block using a block header. This
solution does not work with other methods like smart contracts
and ZK proofs, as we described in §8.2.
10 CONCLUSION
We present BDoS, the first Blockchain denial-of-service attack
that uses incentive manipulation. BDoS sabotages the incentive
mechanism behind Nakamoto’s consensus by proving the attacker
has achieved an advantage in mining without releasing her com-
plete block. Such proof reduces miners’ incentive to mine to be
less profitable than not mining. Thus, rational profit-driven min-
ers would cease mining. We show that cryptocurrencies based on
Nakamoto’s blockchain are vulnerable to BDoS under realistic set-
tings, and propose mitigations.
The header-only publication capability we present is a realistic
extension of the standard model under which blockchain protocols
typically analyzed. This could open the door to study new equilibria
and strategies where a miner manipulates the system to increase her
revenue rather than sabotage the system. Secondly, BDoS applies to
heaviest-chain PoW blockchains such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Bitcoin-
Cash, Zcash, and others. It is necessary to understand whether
there are similar attacks against other protocols like Ethereum and
whether our heuristic mitigation applies there as well.
Additionally, alternative incentive-based DoS attacks may exist,
possibly more efficient than BDoS. General bounds and mitigations
are necessary to ensure the security of blockchain protocols.
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A CHANGING ACTION IN THE MIDDLE OF
THE ROUND
In the model, we assumed that no rational miner changes her
action in the middle of the round. We now justify this assumption.
Asmentioned earlier, the coin price is assumed to be constant during
the entire game. Therefore, the honest game profitability factor 𝜔𝑏𝑖
of P𝑖 keeps its value constant during the round. In addition, we
assume that no miner withholds blocks. We define as Time𝑗 the
time when round 𝑗 ends and round 𝑗 + 1 starts.
Claim A.1. If P𝑖 chooses an action 𝑎 in the beginning of round 𝑗
(Time𝑗−1), she does not gain anything from changing her action for
all 𝑡 that hold Time𝑗−1 < 𝑡 < Time𝑗 .
Proof. We know that the rational miner P𝑖 chose the most
beneficial action 𝑎 in the beginning of round 𝑟 , assume by contra-
diction that it is beneficial for P𝑖 to change her action in time 𝑡1
that holds Time𝑗−1 < 𝑡1 < Time𝑗 to a different action 𝑎′ s.t 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎′.
Previous works showed that new block appearance in the system
can be described with Poisson distribution, with the time between
blocks correspond to exponential distribution [86]. One of the prop-
erties of this distribution is that it is memoryless. Since P𝑖 has the
same probability of finding a new block as she had at the beginning
of the round (and so do other miners), she has the same expected
revenue from each action. If changing action in the middle of a
round is profitable, this implies that changing an action was also
beneficial at the beginning of the round. This is a contradiction to
the fact that P𝑖 is rational and chose the best action at the beginning
of the round. □
Note that for memorylessness, we had to assume that there is
no block withholding in the system, i.e., in every point during the
round, it is known by everyone that there was no new block mined,
by any miner, since the beginning of the round. For example, this
assumption does not hold when there is an active selfish mining
attack [33]. Although, it is reasonable to assume that no miner is
withholding blocks during the attack as there is no evidence of
cases of selfish mining attacks in the wild.
B MINE IN STATE 0 AND STATE 2 ALWAYS
BETTER ACTION THAN STOP
Throughout the paper, we assume that miners always play mine
in State 0 and State 2. We now prove formally that mine is always
better action than stop in these states. In other words, assume that
there are two strategies that differ only by the action in state 0 (or
state 2), namely strategy 𝑆𝐴 uses action minewhile strategy 𝑆𝐵 uses
stop. It necessary means that𝑈𝑆𝐴 > 𝑈𝑆𝐵 .
Claim B.1. If 𝜔𝑏𝑖 > 1 then mine in state 0 and state 2 is always
more profitable than stop for P𝑖 .
Proof. We show the claim for state 0. The proof for state 2 is
the equivalent. As we did before we consider two strategies 𝑆𝐴 and
𝑆𝐵 that differ only by the action in state 0 (mine for 𝑆𝐴 vs. stop for
𝑆𝐵 ). We need to compare the utilities of two strategies that differ
only by the action of P𝑖 in state 0. First, we observe that 𝑝1 does
not change as a result of P𝑖 ’s action in state 0. This is because the
rate from state 0 to state 1 and the rate from state 1 to state 2 are
· · · 𝐵∗ 𝐵A 𝐵P
(a) Equivalent to State 0
Figure 9: States
not affected by wether or not P𝑖 mines in state 0 (or state 2). We
denote with 𝜌𝑠 the normalized profit rate in state 𝑠 , it is equal to
the product of the expected block reward, and the normalized rate
P𝑖 finds blocks. We denote with 𝜌1 and 𝜌2 the expected profit rates
in states 1 and 2 respectively. With 𝜌mine and 𝜌stop the profit rates
of playing mine and stop in state 0 respectively. We denote with
𝑝0 and 𝑝2 the state probabilities of state 0 and state 2, respectively,
when playing mine in state 0. We denote with 𝑝0’ and 𝑝2’ the state
probabilities of state 0 and state 2 respectively when playing stop
in state 0. Therefore the utility of playing mine in state 0 is:
𝑈mine = 𝜌mine · 𝑝0 + 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · 𝑝2 .
Similarly, the utility of playing stop in state 0 is:
𝑈stop = 𝜌stop · 𝑝 ′0 + 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · 𝑝 ′2 .
The profit rates in state 1 and state 2 (𝜌1 and 𝜌2) can not be larger
than the profit rate in state 0 (𝜌mine) as 𝜌mine is the maximal possible
profit rate. Therefore, it holds that 𝜌mine ≥ 𝜌1, 𝜌2 and 𝜌mine > 0
(as 𝜔𝑏𝑖 > 1). Additionally, there is no reward and cost when not
mining, so 𝜌stop = 0. Thus, the following inequality holds:
𝑈mine = 𝜌mine · 𝑝0 + 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · 𝑝2 ≥ 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · (𝑝0 + 𝑝2)
= 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · (𝑝 ′0 + 𝑝 ′2) > 𝜌1 · 𝑝1 + 𝜌2 · 𝑝 ′2 = 𝑈stop .
□
C COST OF 51% ATTACK
We show our calculation for the cost of 51% attack. At the mo-
ment of writing this paper, the total hash rate of Bitcoin is roughly
100,000,000 TH/s. The most advanced mining equipment is con-
sidered to be Bitmain S17 Pro which has hashrate of 53 TH/s and
power consumption of 2.094 kWh [8]. The official cost of a unit is
$2128. Another widely used ASIC machine, which is significantly
cheaper to acquire, is Bitmain S9 SE [71]. The hash rate of this
machine is 16 TH/s; its power consumption is 1.280 kWh and unit
price $350. The number of S17 Pro rigs required to have the ma-
jority of mining power in the network is: ⌈ 100,000,00053 ⌉ = 1,886,793.
With total cost of 1,886,793 · 2128 = $4B and power consumption
of 1,886,793 · 2.094 = 94,822,669 kWh which with electricity price
of 0.037 $kWh would cost $3.5M a day. Similarly, for S9 SE, the equip-
ment cost would be $2.2B, and the daily electricity cost would
be $7.1M.
D BDOS WITH SPV - MARKOV CHAINS
In this section we describe the CTMC (Continuous Time
Markov Chains) for a rational miner with the action space
{𝑆stop, 𝑆mine, 𝑆SPV}.
This Markov Chains (fig. 10) for 𝑆stop and 𝑆mine are similar to
the ones shown in fig. 2. Although, the chains described in fig. 10
have an extra edge from state 1 to state 0 with rate 𝜆 · 𝛼𝐵A that
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(a) 𝑆mine: P𝑖 mines on 𝐵∗ in state 1
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(b) 𝑆stop: P𝑖 stops mining in state 1
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(c) 𝑆SPV: P𝑖 mines on 𝐵A in state 1
Figure 10: Markov chain.
corresponds to the portion of rational miners (excluding P𝑖 ) that
keep mining during the attack. In fig. 10c there is an additional
edge from state 1 to state 0 with rate 𝜆 · 𝛼𝑖 , as now P𝑖 also mines
during the attack.
E PSEUDO-CODE FOR MODEL
In this section, we describe the pseudo-code for the scheduler (al-
gorithm 1), adversary (algorithm 2) and the rational miner (algo-
rithm 3) that were described in §3.1. Note that for simplicity of
the pseudocode we denote the mining power of rational miner P𝑖
as 𝛼P𝑖 as well, so 𝛼P𝑖 B 𝛼𝑖 .
Algorithm 1 Scheduler
1: 𝑟 ← 0
2:
3: loop // The scheduler runs in an infinite loop.
4: 𝑟 ← 𝑟 + 1
5: active← ∅
6: for p ∈ {A, P1, . . . , P𝑛 } do
7: if p.Mine_This_Round = true then
8: templatep ← p.Get_Block_Template
9: active← active⋃ p
10: end if
11: end for
12: 𝑇 ← Exp_Distribution(𝜆 ·∑p∈active 𝛼p)
13: sleep(𝑇 ) // Simulate block time.
14: w← Sample by weight of hashrate from active
15: 𝐵𝑟 ← Generate_Valid_Block(𝑟, templatew)
16:
17: if w = A then
18: publish← A.Find_New_Block(𝐵𝑟 )
19: if publish = “header” then
20: 𝐻 = Get_Header(𝐵𝑟 )
21: for p ∈ {P1, . . . , P𝑛 } do p.Add_Header(𝐻)
22: else if publish = “full block” then
23: for p ∈ {A, P1, . . . , P𝑛 } do p.Add_Block(𝐵𝑟 )
24: end if
25: else
26: competing← A.Get_Competing_Blocks(𝐵𝑟 )
27: if competing.empty = true then
28: for p ∈ {A, P1, . . . , P𝑛 } do p.Add_Block(𝐵𝑟 )
29: else
30: Send_Blocks(w, [𝐵𝑟 ] + competing)
31: Send_Blocks(A, competing + [𝐵𝑟 ])
32: for p ∈ {P1, . . . , P𝑛 } \ {w} do
33: with probability 𝛾 (1−𝛼A )1−𝛼A−𝛼w :
34: Send_Blocks(p, competing + [𝐵𝑟 ])
35: with probability 1 − 𝛾 (1−𝛼A )1−𝛼A−𝛼w :
36: Send_Blocks(p, [𝐵𝑟 ] + competing)
37: end for
38: end if
39: end if
40: end loop
41:
42: function Send_Blocks(p, blocks)
43: for 𝐵 ∈ blocks do p.Add_Block(𝐵)
44: end function
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Algorithm 2 Adversary A
1: 𝐿A ← {𝐵0 },𝑂A [𝐵0 ] ← 0, 𝑟 ← 0
2: 𝐵withheld ← ⊥, 𝐵extend ← 𝐵0
3:
4: functionMine_This_Round
5: 𝑟 ← 𝑟 + 1
6: if 𝐵withheld = ⊥ then
7: return true
8: else
9: return false
10: end if
11: end function
12:
13: function Get_Block_Template
14: return Generate_Template(A,Get_Header(𝐵extend))
15: end function
16:
17: function Find_New_Block(𝐵 )
18: 𝐵withheld ← 𝐵
19: return “header”
20: end function
21:
22: function Get_Competing_Blocks(𝐵 )
23: if Get_Height(𝐵) = Get_Height(𝐵withheld) then
24: 𝐵withheld ← ⊥
25: return [𝐵withheld ]
26: else
27: return []
28: end if
29: end function
30:
31: function Add_Block(𝐵 )
32: 𝐿A ← 𝐿A ⋃{𝐵 },𝑂A [𝐵 ] ← |𝐿A |
33: if 𝐵 = 𝐵withheld then
34: 𝐵withheld ← ⊥
35: end if
36: if Get_Height(𝐵) > Get_Height(𝐵extend) then
37: 𝐵extend ← 𝐵
38: end if
39: end function
Algorithm 3 Rational Player P𝑖
1: 𝐿𝑖 ← {𝐵0 },𝑂𝑖 [𝐵0 ] ← 0, 𝑟 ← 0
2: 𝐵header ← ⊥, 𝐵extend ← 𝐵0
3: 𝑀 ← Get_Best_Strategy(BDoS, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝜔𝑏𝑖 )
4:
5: functionMine_This_Round
6: 𝑟 ← 𝑟 + 1
7: if 𝑀 [𝐿𝑖 ] [𝑂𝑖 ] = stop then
8: return false
9: else
10: return true
11: end if
12: end function
13:
14: function Get_Block_Template
15: if 𝑀 [𝐿𝑖 ] [𝑂𝑖 ] = mineSPV then
16: return Generate_Template(P𝑖 ,Get_Header(𝐵header))
17: else if 𝑀 [𝐿𝑖 ] [𝑂𝑖 ] = mine then
18: return Generate_Template(P𝑖 ,Get_Header(𝐵extend))
19: end if
20: end function
21:
22: function Add_Block(𝐵 )
23: 𝐿A ← 𝐿A ⋃{𝐵 },𝑂A [𝐵 ] ← |𝐿A |
24: if Get_Header(𝐵) = Get_Header(𝐵header) then
25: 𝐵header ← ⊥
26: end if
27: if Get_Height(𝐵) > Get_Height(𝐵extend) then
28: 𝐵extend ← 𝐵
29: end if
30: end function
31:
32: function Add_Header(𝐻 )
33: 𝐵header ← (𝐻,⊥)
34: end function
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